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DICTA

FAMI LY LAW
By STEVENS PARK KINNEY of the Colorado Bar

Ten cases on the subject of Family Law have been decided
by the Supreme Court of Colorado since September 1954.
Notable among these are decisions involving the Reciprocal
Support Act and the question of the creation by the lower court
of trusts for the payment of alimony and support orders. Four
of the decisions of the trial courts were affirmed and six reversed
in part or toto; giving the lower courts less than a five hundred
percent batting average.
(1) In the case of Mable Graham v. Robert K. Graham, 195455 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 1, the question presented was whether or
not the Plaintiff had contracted a good and valid common-law marriage so that her divorced husband would be relieved from paying
alimony under an order for such entered by a Wyoming court.
This order specifically provided that alimony payments would cease
upon the remarriage of the wife.
The evidence showed that the Plaintiff assumed and'went by
the name of the second alleged husband; that she had lived with
him in an apartment house for at least four months, and represented herself to the neighbors as his wife. This evidence, the
Court held, was sufficient to show a good common-law marriage
had been contracted by the plaintiff and the second husband, thereby relieving the defendant of further alimony payments.
This case holds with the former rulings of the Colorado Court
on common-law marriage: that actual cohabitation coupled with
representations of marital status are sufficient to show intent and
contract necessary to establish the marriage relationship.
(2) Frank Granatov. Hazel Granato, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh.
No. 3, Rehearing in Adv. Sh. No. 4, presented the question whether
a property settlement award made by the lower Court should stand.
The trial court awarded real estate valued at $10,000.00 subject to a deed of trust of more than $8,000.00, and personal property
of some $500.00 to the wife. No alimony award was made and the
question of support was held in abeyance. The husband objected
to the award on the grounds that such constituted all the property
that the parties owned. The husband also claimed that the holder
of the deed of trust should be included as an interested party in the
proceedings.
Based on the testimony, the Supreme Court denied the claims
of the husband. It held that property divisions are based on the
merits of each case and the trial court may use its discretion in
such orders. Unless the court abuses its discretion no error results. While the equity in the house, and other personal property
may have constituted all their common property, the husband could
not complain in this instance. The Supreme Court was no doubt
influenced by the fact that the total property award in lieu of
alimony was less than $2,500.00.
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And further, although the holder of the deed of trust appeared
and testified to the effect that if the wife received the property he
would cut the monthly payments on the loan; he was not a party
to the action, and any change in the loan contract was strictly a
matter between him and the owner of the property. The holder
of the loan was an uncle of the wife, not even a prospective suito.
The holding in this case is in keeping with past decisions that
property settlements are within the right of the trial court to determine, and if they are kept within the bounds of the court's discretion and jurisdiction they will be upheld.
(3) In Potter v. Potter, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6, a
type of case that will become more numerous in the future arises.
For the issue here comes under the Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act which Colorado and nearly every other state has now
adopted in some form.
Herein a mother residing in California sued the father residing in Colorado for monthly support of a minor child. The
County of Los Angeles joined in asking for $1,549.59 as its past
contribution for the support of the minor.
The father offered in his defense, a divorce decree from the
state of Texas which set forth orders for the payment of support
for the minor children of the parties. At the hearing the father
testified as to his earnings, and after an order was entered directing
him to pay $50.00 per month support, and to reimburse the County
for its contribution, appealed to the Supreme Court. His grounds:
that the mother had failed to prove a cause of action, and the lower
court had failed to give full faith and credit to the Texas decree.
The Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the lower court,
holding that the testimony of the father was sufficient to base the
awards as made thereon; that the Texas decree was not properly
offered, and even if it had been, that it was not a final order and
therefore not subject to the full faith and credit provisions of the
Colorado Constitution.
(4) In the Matter of Florence Pettington Wright v. The People in the Interest of Martha Victoria Rowe, Dependent, et al.,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 6, the validity of a dependency adjudication was the issue.
This case is best stated in the words of the Court:
Herein a petition in dependency was filed in the
County Court of Clear Creek County by Florence Vorenberg, Director of the Clear Creek County Department of
Public Welfare, by which it was sought to have Martha
Victoria Rowe and Margaret Elizabeth Rowe adjudged to
be dependents. Florence P. Wright was named as respondent in the Petition; citation was served on her in
Larimer County, and her answer to the Petition was filed.
Upon trial it was adjudged that the children were dependent and neglected children, and that they be placed under
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the custody and care of the Clear Creek County Department of Public Welfare, for adoption.
Further facts were that under a divorce decree of the Larimer
County Court, the father had been awarded the custody of the
aforementioned children and the mother was granted visitation
rights. The father had brought the children to the Clear Creek
County Court and had signed a relinquishment of his rights.
Prior thereto, the father had moved about with the children
and the mother claimed their whereabouts was unknown to her
from 1950 until August of 1954 when a welfare worker came to
see her to get her to sign a consent for the adoption of the children.
The Petition in Dependency was filed in the Clear Creek
County Court on the 17th of August, the mother was served on
the 19th of that month, and trial was set for the 20th. Prior to the
trial date the mother filed a motion with the Larimer County Court
asking for the custody of the children.
In its opinion the Supreme Court deals at length with the testimony of the dependency hearing. The mother, her husband, and
two neighbor friends testified that the mother was a fit and proper
person to have the children.
Then the trial court allowed the People, over objections, to
enter its records, to have portions read therefrom, and took these
into consideration in its delibe-ations. Further hearsay testimony
was admitted, and an admission was made that the mother was not
contacted at the time of the relinquishment because the father did
not wish that she be.
To cap the climax, a "Confidential Report" on the mother made
up by the Welfare Department of Larimer County and marked
"Confidential" was produced, portions of it testified to by the wel'fare worker of Clear Creek County, who admitted she did not
make it up, but the report itself was exempted from being introduced because the court ruled it was confidential-all over the
objections of counsel for the mother.
Further hearsay evidence as to the findings of a psychologist
at the University of Colorado was offered and received. But why
go on. The trial court admitted reams of hearsay, all over objection.
The Supreme Court set aside the dependency findings, citing
the case of Bailey v. Bullock, 110 Colorado 205, which held that
"hearings in the Juvenile Court are under and bound by the rules
of evidence as in any other Court;" and if these rules are not followed error results.
In checking over the evidence submitted, the Supreme Court
found that no competent evidence had been offered to show that
the mother was unfit, and until such evidence is offered, she had
the right to the custody of the children. The Court cited Everett
v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34. The custody of the children was given to
the mother.
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(5) In the case of Storey v. Shumaker, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv.
Sh. No. 7, the question of two dependency and one adoption proceeding came up for review.
On January 19th, 1951, a petition in dependency relative to
Pamela Ann Storey was filed by John C. Shumaker in the Jefferson
County Court. On August 20th, 1951 without notice to the mother,
the Court found the child dependent and custody was granted to
Mr. and Mrs. John Shumaker.
On August 21st, 1952, the Shumakers filed a Petition in adoption for the child alleging that the Court had granted them care
and custody.
On September 30th, 1952, the mother filed a motion to vacate
the order of dependency and to stay proceedings in the adoption
matter. On this date a second dependency petition was filed by the
Shumakers, service thereon was had on the mother and upon hearing, the child was again found dependent and custody awarded to
the Shumakers.
On March 25th, 1953 an interlocutory decree of adoption was
granted to the Shumakers based on their original petition filed
August 21st, 1951. No written consent of the mother was obtained
and no notice was served on her.
The mother filed objections to the adoption decree on the
grounds that the Court did not have jurisdiction to enter such as
she had given no consent nor had she been served with any notice.
The Shumakers' stand was that the mother's right was divested by
the dependency hearings.
The question therefore was: Did the filing of the second Petition in Dependency and the order issued thereunder obviate the
necessity of obtaining the mother's consent, or the serving of the
notice on her as to the time and place of the adoption proceeding?
The Supreme Court held it did not, for at the time the adoption
petition was filed, no valid order of dependency was in effect, and
until such time, the rights of the mother were clearly defined in
Chapter 106, S.L. Colo. 1949. Until the provisions therein were
fully complied with, no valid adoption decree could enter. The trial
court was instructed to vacate the adoption decree.
(6) In Arzelia Bilorusky v. Alexander Bilorusky, 1954-55
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 8, the point in review concerned the admission
of a letter in evidence. The wife had filed for separate maintenance, and the husband cross-filed for divorce. On trial the jury
found for the husband, and the divorce was granted.
At the trial the wife produced a letter allegedly written by her
husband to another woman, the contents of which showed that he
had been meeting her and wished to continue the relationship, and
also professed his love for her.
The wife stated that she was familiar with the writing of her
husband, but upon objection, the court ruled the letter could not be
introduced. In his testimony, the husband admitted writing the
letter, but still the court refused to admit it.
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The Supreme Court ruled that the letter had been properly
identified and it should have been admitted. A new trial ordered.
As dicta, the point was not in issue, the Court held that an
instruction given in the case was erroneous, to wit: "The Court instructs the jury that the obligation of the husband to support the
wife and the minor child of the parties is the same whether the
wife obtains a decree of separate maintenance or the husband obtains a decree of divorce."
(7) In Norah M. Walker, Administratrix of the Estate of
D elphy Walker, deceased v. Otto Walker, Otes Walker, et al.,
1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 9, the issue concerned a property
settlement made between the wife and husband during their marriage.
Delphy Walker and Norah were man and wife. At his death
the widow was appointed administratrix and claimed his property.
The other heirs contended that she and her husband had entered
into a property settlement in November of 1948, and that under
such agreement she had received certain property and had waived
any right or claim to further demands from the husband including
the right of inheritance.
Norah Walker contended that the terms of the agreement
were unfair and had not been explained to her. At the trial the
testimony of the wife failed to impress the Court, and she presented much that was barred by the "dead-man statute."
The testimony for the other heirs including that of Attorney
Hatfield of the Durango Bar, did impress the Court, and the property settlement was held good and valid.
The Supreme Court concurred, citing Hughes v. Leonard, 66
Colo. 500, and Brimble v. Sickler, 83 Colo. 494 as supporting their
decision.
Principal: A property settlement may be made between husband and wife during the marriage, cutting off the wife's right of
inheritance, and this will be upheld. However, the Court did not
rule out the possibility that such might be set aside if not found to
comply with the rules of equity.
(8) In Fletcher M. Brown v. Katherine J. Brown, 1954-55
C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 10, the court in its orders under a property
settlement set up a trust.
This ruling provided that the husband turn over to the wife,
the income from a trust, which amounted to $8,550.00 per year.
She was to hold this as trustee, for the support of minor children
of the parties. The funds were to support them, and if this income
provided a surplus, such should be kept for future years. The
husband was enjoined from pledging, mortgaging, selling or disposing of this trust property.
The question presented on review was: Did the lower court
have the authority to set up such a trust for the children?
The Supreme Court held it did not. Such a trust could not be
set up without the consent of the parties. The Court indicated that
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if the one in whose favor the trust was created objected, that such
objections would not be sustained. But in this case, the one against
whom the trust operated complained, and that such objections were
good, and the trial court had exceeded its authority.
Principal: In a property settlement, the trial court cannot
create a trust unless by consent of the parties, or unless agreed to,
or accepted by, the one against whom the trust is created. The
party in whose favor the trust is created cannot object.
(9) In Raymond F. Elmer v. Mildred L. Elmer, 1954-55 C.B.A.
Adv. Sh. No. 12, the question of the validity of a trust order under
a property settlement is raised.
In this case the husband was ordered to pay permanent alimony of $350.00 per month, and that this should take the form of an
annuity trust, with a substantial insurance company, which shall
guarantee the wife an income of $350.00 monthly for the rest of
her life, and further provide that if the wife should die before 20
years, any unpaid balance would go to the children. The husband
had 30 days to set up this trust.
It was shown that it would take a sum in excess of $90,000.00
to creat such a trust.
The Supreme Court found no precedent for such an order.
In consistency with its ruling in the case of Brown v. Brown, supra,
the Court found such a trust not only beyond the jurisdiction of
the court to order, but from the evidence out of the financial means
of the husband to provide. The trust order was set aside with
directions to set a fair and reasonabie amount of alimony for the
wife.
Principal: Alimony payments cannot be set up or guaranteed
by the creation of an insurance trust.
(10) A matter of child custody is involved in Mary Jane Bird
v. Earl Allen Bird, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv. Sh. No. 12.
In the original divorce decree in 1947 the mother was granted
the custody of three children. In 1954 the father obtained a modification of this order, he to have two children, the mother one.
From this change, the Supreme Court is petitioned for review.
After a complete review of the testimony, which was taken
at length over a period of time by the lower court, the Supreme
Court found nothing derogatory concerning the care and custody
of the mother, and also fearful of the bad effect of separating the
children, found no grounds for the modification of the custodial
order. Therefore it was set aside and the original order restored.
Principal: Modification of a custodial order should only be
made within the sound discretion of the court. If this is abused the
change will be set aside.

